Ronald W. Hardy v. Jean Hardy : Brief of Appellant by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
2004
Ronald W. Hardy v. Jean Hardy : Brief of Appellant
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Blaine T. Hofeling; Hofeling and Wayment, LLP; Attorney for Appellant.
Jennifer P. Lee; Smart, Schofield; Attorney for Appellee.
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Hardy v. Hardy, No. 20040812 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2004).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/5236
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
RONALD W. HARDY, 
Petitioner/Appellant, 
v. 
JEAN HARDY (SMELTZER), 
Respondent/Appellee. 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
Court of Appeals No. 20040812 
Trial Court No. 944500067DA 
Appeal from Order of Fifth Judicial District Court, 
In and For Iron County, Honorable J. Philip Eves 
Blaine T. Hofeling 
Hofeling & Wayment, LLP 
Attorneys for Appellant 
51 East 400 North, Bldg. 1 
Cedar City, Utah 84720 
A 
Jennifer P. Lee 
Smart, Schofield 
Attorneys for Appellee 
5295 S. Commerce Dr. #200 
Murray, Utah 84107 
MBltCWRT OF AFPBfi^% 
UTAH 
DOCUMENT 
K F U 
50 
.A10 
DOCKET NO. IQD<JD*BI< 
-ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED-
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
RONALD W. HARDY, 
Petitioner/Appellant, 
v. 
JEAN HARDY (SMELTZER), 
Respondent/Appellee. 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
Court of Appeals No. 20040812 
Trial Court No. 944500067DA 
Appeal from Order of Fifth Judicial District Court, 
In and For Iron County, Honorable J. Philip Eves 
Blaine T. Hofeling 
Hofeling & Wayment, LLP 
Attorneys for Appellant 
51 East 400 North, Bldg. 1 
Cedar City, Utah 84720 
Jennifer P. Lee 
Smart, Schofield 
Attorneys for Appellee 
5295 S. Commerce Dr. #200 
Murray, Utah 84107 
-ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED-
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
PAGE 
RELIEF REQUESTED 1 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES iii. 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION iv. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES iv. 
STANDARDS OF REVIEW iv. 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 2 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 2 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 3 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 4 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 6 
ARGUMENT 8 
POINT I Are the Court's Conclusions of Law clearly erroneous? 
POINT II Did the Court err in not holding Appellee in contempt for failing 
to be aware of the governing visitation statute even where the 
same denies statutory visitation to the noncustodial parent? 
POINT III Parents in divorce situations with children subject to visitation 
should have a duty to know and obey the latest version of the 
visitation statute? 
CONCLUSIONS 15 
ADDENDUM Addendum 1 
-ii-
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
Bailey v. Call, 767 P.2d 138, (Utah App. 1989) 1, 2, 8, 10 
Board of Education of Nebo School Dist. V. Jeppson, 280 P. 1065 
(Utah 1929) 11, 12, 13, 14 
Charlseworth v. State of California, 793 P.2d 411 (Utah App. 1990) 1, 2, 8,10 
Ferguson ».•. Allen, 26 \\ f>70 (Utah IH'.M) I I, 12, 13 
Groberg v. Housing Opportunities, Inc., 68 P.3d 1015 (Utah App. 2003) 1, 2, 8,10 
Roderick v. Ricks, 54 P.3d 1119 (Utah 2002) 1,2,8,10 
Union Pacific Railroad Company v. Sterling H. Nelson & Sons, Inc., 
552 P.2d 649 (Utah 1976) 11,13,14 
Von Hake v. Thomas, 759 P.2d 1162 (Utah 1988) 9 
-in-
RELIEF REQUESTED 
Appellant seeks a reversal of the trial court's determination that Appellee should not 
be held in contempt for violating Appellant's visitation rights In so doing, Appellant seeks 
a published ruling by this Court as to whether parents in divorce situations, where minor 
children and visitation are involved, have a duty to know and understand and comply with 
the most recent statutory version governing visitation. 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-
3(2)(h)(2004). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Are the Court's Conclusions of Law clearly erroneous? 
Citations to Determinative Statutes, Rules and Cases: See Standard of 
Reviewsection. 
Standard of Review: This Court reviews challenges to a trial court's 
conclusions of law under a correction of error standard. See Groberg v. 
Housing Opportunities, Inc., 68 P.3d 1015,1017 (Utah App. 2003); Bailey v. 
Call, 767 P.2d 138, 139-40 (Utah App. 1989). This standard mandates 
that this Court give no deference to the legal conclusions of the trial 
court. See Roderick v. Ricks, 54 P.3d 1119 (Utah 2002). 
2. Did the Court err in not holding Appellee in contempt for failing to be 
aware of the governing visitation statute even where the same denies 
statutory visitation to the noncustodial parent? 
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Standard of Review: This Court reviews challenges to a trial court's 
conclusions of law under a correction of error standard. See Groberg v. 
Housing Opportunities, Inc., 68 P.3d 1015,1017 (Utah App. 2003); Bailey v. 
Call, 767 P.2d 138, 139-40 (Utah App. 1989). This standard mandates 
that this Court give no deference to the legal conclusions of the trial 
court. See Roderick v. Ricks, 54 P.3d 1119 (Utah 2002). 
3. Parents in divorce situations with children subject to visitation should 
have a duty to know and obey the latest version of the visitation 
statute-and the Court should express a duty in this regard. 
Standard of Review: This Court reviews challenges to a trial court's 
conclusions of law under a correction of error standard. See Groberg v. 
Housing Opportunities, Inc., 68 P.3d 1015,1017 (Utah App. 2003); Bailey v. 
Call, 767 P.2d 138, 139-40 (Utah App. 1989). This standard mandates 
that this Court give no deference to the legal conclusions of the trial 
court. See Roderick v. Ricks, 54 P.3d 1119 (Utah 2002). 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
Appellant is not aware of any determinative Constitutional Provisions. 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-35 (2004) 4, 5, 6, 8, 10, 12, 14 
Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-33(5) (2004) 6, 7, 8, 10 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
This matter, on appeal, appears to be one of first impression. Appellant is not 
aware of any Utah law bearing directly upon the issues in question 
This case overall involves a rather lengthy and difficult divorce case where there 
have been numerous issues and problems through the years One of the recurring 
problems has been Appellee's patternistic violation of Appellant's visitation rights. This 
appeal involves one such violation As set forth with the required citations below, this 
particular violation of visitation by Appellee involves the visitation on President's Day 
Holiday in February of 2002. Appellee delivered the parties' minor child for visitation two 
days later than required by statute. Appellant filed a Motion for Order to Show Cause as 
a result of the missed visitation. At the hearing on Appellant's Order to Show Cause, 
Appellee claimed that she should not be held in contempt because she was relying on an 
outdated version of the visitation statute and therefore did not have the intent necessary 
to be held in contempt. The trial court excused her conduct. This appeal followed. 
Course of the Proceedings 
As set forth herein, this appeal does not involve the entire and rather lengthy divorce 
matter. It involves only the trial court's ruling from a hearing on Appellant's Order to Show 
Cause involving missed visitation. 
Disposition of the Trial Court 
Also as set forth herein, the trial court ruled that because Appellee was relying on 
an outdated version of the visitation statute, she did not have the requisite willfulness 
necessary to hold her in contempt. 
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STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
1. Appellant and Appellee are the natural parents of a minor child, Gabnelle 
Hardy, dob: May 22, 1992 (R. 50-52). 
2. Appellant is the non-custodial parent and Appellee is the custodial parent 
(R 365-373) 
3. Appellant was entitled to visitation with the parties' minor child over the 
President's Day Holiday in February of 2002 (R. 365-373; R 1185, p. 11). 
4 Specifically, Appellant was entitled to visitation from Friday at 6:00 p.m. to 
Monday at 7:00 p.m. "unless the holiday extends for lengthier period of time 
to which the noncustodial parent is completely entitled." (R. 365-373; R. 
1185, p. 11; see also Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-35); 
5. Appellee delivered the parties' minor child on Sunday at 6:00 p.m. (R. 1185, 
p. 14). 
6. Thereafter, Appellant brought an Order to Show Cause for missed visitation. 
(R. 1038-1040). 
7. The Order to Show Cause was heard on or about May 24, 2004. (R. 1185), 
8. Appellee admitted to the facts as set forth herein, but testified that she was 
relying upon an old, outdated version of the statute and, under her version, 
she delivered the parties' minor child properly for visitation. (R. 1185, pp. 28-
29).1 
1
 Appellee feigned ignorance of the most recent statute at the hearing before the trial court She 
feigned this ignorance even though she was apparently aware that the statute had been modified in other 
particulars It is important to note here that a letter was admitted into evidence at the hearing in this 
matter which indicated that Appellee was aware that the statute had been amended (R 1174) 
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9 The trial court concluded that Appellee did, indeed, deny Appellant visitation 
(R 1185, pp 50-52) 
10 However, the trial court further held that the denial was not willful given the 
fact that Appellee was relying upon an outdated version of the statute and 
that she, in fact, delivered the parties' minor child for part of the visitation 
Id 
11 The trial court made the following findings of tact 
a Defendant denied Petitioner effectively two (2) days of visitation over 
the Presidents' Holiday, 2002, 
b Defendant relied upon an outdated version of the visitation statute 
that, by Presidents' Holiday, 2002, had been modified to expand the 
visitation on said holiday; 
c. Defendant actually delivered the parties' minor child for visitation at 
approximately 6 00 p m on the Sunday of Presidents' Holiday, 2002, 
d. Said delivery was consistent with the outdated version of the statute, 
e. Subsequent amendments to the statute expanded visitation on 
Presidents' Holiday, as follows: 
§ 30-3-35(g)(n) Washington and Lincoln Day 
beginning at 6 00 p m on Friday until 7 00 p m 
on Monday unless the holiday extends for a 
Additionally, Appellee successfully used an amendment to this very statute on a prior occasion to defeat a 
prior Order to Show Cause involving a denial of visitation (R 387 90 391 99, 400-11) Additionally, and 
of equal importance, this Court can take judicial notice of the fact that the amendment to the statute in 
question went into effect nearly two years prior to the denial of visitation in this matter (See Appendix II, 
attached hereto) 
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lengthier period of time to which the noncustodial 
parent is completely entitled 
(R. 1178-1180) 
12 The trial court made the following conclusions of law 
a Even though Defendant denied Plaintiff visitation, because Defendant 
was relying upon an old version of the statute and did in fact deliver 
the parties' minor child for part of the visitation, the Court cannot 
conclude that Defendant's denial was wilful, 
b Defendant cannot, therefore, be held in contempt; 
c. Plaintiff is entitled to make up visitation which shall consist of one 
week of uninterrupted visitation during the summer of 2004; 
d. The Court's Order to Show Cause is therefore dismissed; 
e. Both parties shall bear their costs and attorneys' fees. 
Id. See Addendum 1, attached hereto. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
The law requires that the custodial parent, in this case Appellee, have the parties' 
minor child ready for pick up at the beginning of a visitation period. See Utah Code Ann. 
§ 30-3-33(5) (2004) ("the custodial parent shall have the child ready for parent-time at the 
time he is to be picked up . . . ."). Additionally, the decree of divorce between the parties 
calls for visitation to be consistent with Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-35 (2004). This statute calls 
for visitation for Washington and Lincoln Day "beginning at 6 p.m on Friday until Monday 
at 7 p m " There is no question, in fact all parties agree, that Appellee did not comply 
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with this statute. There is no provision in the law that would excuse a custodial parent for 
denying visitation by reliance on an old and outdated version of the statute. As a result, 
the trial court's conclusions of law are clearly erroneous. 
POINT I! 
As set forth above, a custodial parent has a duty to have the parties' minor children 
ready for pick up at the beginning of a visitation period. See Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-33(5) 
(2004) ("the custodial parent shall have the child ready for parent-time at the time he is to 
be picked up . . . ."). The legislature often changes statutes and the visitation statute is 
fairly susceptible to change over time. The evidence adduced at the hearing indicates that 
Appellee was aware that there are and were periodic changes to the visitation statute. As 
a result, a custodial parent should be required to familiarize himself or herself with the 
visitation statute and comply therewith. As a result, the trial court erred by not holding 
Appellee in contempt for failing to be aware of and follow the governing visitation statute. 
POINT III 
This Court should express a duty on parents in divorce situations where minor 
children are subject to visitation to know and obey the most current and governing visitation 
statute. Individuals have such duties to know the law in other contexts. It would seem 
reasonable and rational to require that in circumstances such as those involved in this case 
that a party violating visitation should have a duty to know and follow the statute and 
should not be able to claim ignorance as an ally. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
ARETHETRIAL COURTS CONCLUSIONS OF 
LAW CLEARLY ERRONEOUS? 
This Court reviews challenges to a trial court's conclusions of law under a correction 
of error standard See Groberg v Housing Opportunities, Inc , 68 P 3d 1015,1017 (Utah 
App 2003), Bailey v. Call, 767 P 2d 138, 139-40 (Utah App 1989) This Standard 
mandates that this Court give no deference to the legal conclusions of the trial court 
See Roderick v Ricks, 54 P 3d 1119 (Utah 2002) 
In this case, as in all divorce cases where visitation has been awarded to the non-
custodial parent, the law requires that the custodial parent, in this case Appellee, have the 
parties' minor child ready for pick up at the beginning of a visitation period. See Utah Code 
Ann. § 30-3-33(5) (2004) ("the custodial parent shall have the child ready for parent-time 
at the time he is to be picked up . . ."); see also Charlseworth v. State of California, 793 
P.2d 411, 414-15 (Utah App. 1990) (Orme, J , dissenting) ("[the custodial parent] has the 
legal duty to make the children available for reasonable visitation") Additionally, the 
decree of divorce between the parties calls for visitation to be consistent with Utah Code 
Ann. § 30-3-35 (2004) (See Addendum II, attached hereto) This statute calls for visitation 
for Washington and Lincoln Day "beginning at 6 p m on Friday until Monday at 7 p.m.. . 
J? 
As such, Appellee had a duty to make the parties' minor child available for visitation 
no later than 6 p.m. on the Friday of the Washington and Lincoln day (as set forth in the 
statute), 2002 The facts are clear in the record, as well as the trial court's findings of 
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fact-Appellee failed to fulfill her statutory obligation with respect to visitation She did not 
make the parties' minor child available for visitation as required under the visitation statute 
that governed in 2002 
The trial court made the following conclusion with respect to this issue 
Even though Defendant denied Plaintiff visitation, because 
Defendant was reiymg upon an old version of the statuie and 
did in fact deliver the parties' minor child for part of the 
visitation, the Court cannot conclude that Defendant's denial 
was willful. 
The trial court concluded that there had been a violation of the order and of the 
statute, but concluded that such violation was not willful. In Von Hake v Thomas, 759 P 2d 
1162, 1172 (Utah 1988), the supreme court unequivocally required that trial courts make 
explicit findings on each of the following substantive elements of contempt: "the person 
cited for contempt knew what was required, had the ability to comply, and intentionally 
failed or refused to do so. . . ." Thus, based on Von Hake, a person can be held in 
contempt if the person intentionally failed to comply (willful) or refused to comply 
In the present case, the three elements of contempt have been satisfied* 
1 Appellee knew and was aware that she was required (had a duty) to make 
the parties' minor child available for visitation pursuant to court order and 
statute; 
2 Appellee had the ability to make the child available for visitation; and 
3. Appellee refused to comply with the order and statute. 
As a result, Appellee was clearly in contempt and the trial court's conclusions of law are 
therefore clearly erroneous. 
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POINT II 
DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN FAILING TO HOLD 
APPELLEE IN CONTEMPT FOR BEING UNAWARE 
OF THE CURRENT VISITATION STATUTE 
This Court reviews challenges to a trial court's conclusions of law under a correction 
of error standard See Groberg v Housing Opportunities, Inc , 68 P 3d 1015, 1017 (Utah 
App 2003), Bailey v Call, 767 P 2d 138, 139-40 (Utah App 1989) This standard 
mandates that this Court give no deference to the legal conclusions of the trial court See 
Roderick v Ricks, 54 P 3d 1119 (Utah 2002) 
This appears to be a question of first impression in this state and in other 
jurisdictions The question is whether a divorced parent, with minor children subject to 
visitation, should be held to be aware of the current and governing visitation statute 
As set forth above, In this case, as in all divorce cases where visitation has been 
awarded to the non-custodial parent, the law requires that the custodial parent, in this case 
Appellee, have the parties' minor child ready for pick up at the beginning of a visitation 
period See Utah Code Ann § 30-3-33(5) (2004) ("the custodial parent shall have the child 
ready for parent-time at the time he is to be picked up "), see also Charlseworth v. 
State of California, 793 P 2d 411, 414-15 (Utah App 1990) (Orme, J , dissenting) ("[the 
custodial parent] has the legal duty to make the children available for reasonable 
visitation") Additionally, the decree of divorce between the parties calls for visitation to be 
consistent with Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-35 (2004) This statute calls for visitation for 
Washington and Lincoln Day "beginning at 6 p m on Friday until Monday at 7 p m 
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Appellee feigned ignorance of the most recent statute at the hearing before the trial 
court. She feigned this ignorance even though she was apparently aware that the statute 
had been modified in other particulars. It is important to note here that a letter was 
admitted into evidence at the hearing in this matter which indicated that Appellee was 
aware that the statute had been amended. (R. 1174). Additionally, Appellee successfully 
used an amendment to this very statute on a prior occasion to defeat a prior Order to Show 
Cause involving a denial of visitation.2 (R. 387-90; 391-99; 400-11). Additionally, and of 
equal importance, this Court can take judicial notice of the fact that the amendment to the 
statute in question went into effect nearly two years prior to the denial of visitation in this 
matter. (See Appendix II, attached hereto). 
Appellant requests that, in this case of apparent first impression, this Court set a 
standard for divorced parents with minor children subject to visitation to know and observe 
the latest version of the visitation statute. That standard would place a duty upon divorced 
parents with minor children subject to visitation to know and be awaire of and to comply 
with the most recent and governing version of the visitation statute. While there is no 
authority on this particular question, there are other contexts in which a person or party is 
held to a duty to know the law. See, e.g., Union Pacific Railroad Company v. Sterling H. 
Nelson & Sons, Inc., 552 P.2d 649, 651 (Utah 1976) ("The defendant had a duty to know 
what the laws were . . . ."); Board of Education of Nebo School Dist. V. Jeppson, 280 P. 
1065,1069 (Utah 1929) ("Generally speaking, all men are presumed to know the law, and, 
2
 Ironically, on that occasion Appellent was claiming that Appellee denied him visitaiton. Appellee 
argued that the very statute in question had been amended and that under the amendment Appellant was 
not entitled to the visitation that he claimed. Clearly, therefore, Appellee was aware that the statute had 
been amended and her feigned ignorance is disingenuous. 
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generally speaking, this presumption cannot be overcome by proof to the contrary."); 
Ferguson v. Allen, 26 P. 570 (Utah 1891) ("Officers of election are, like other persons, 
presumed to know the law . . . ."). 
Appellant is not advocating a large or onerous burden in this matter. Appellant is 
merely advocating that a parent, in divorce where minor children are involved and subject 
to visitation, keep himself or herself aware of and apprised of any changes to the statutes 
governing visitation. This Court can take judicial notice that Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-35 was 
enacted in 1993 and was amended in 1997, 2000, 2001 and 2003. Thus, in a twelve year 
period, this statute has undergone four amendments. It would seem likely that the 
legislature will continue to modify this statute. This statute is reasonably short and fairly 
easy to understand. Consistent, therefore, with the above case law indicating a person's 
duty to know the law, Appellant requests that this Court express such a duty with respect 
to the visitation statute on divorced parents who have minor children subject to visitation. 
Appellant further submits that expressing such a duty will be in the best interests of 
children in divorce as it will require parents to remain current with visitation changes and 
to comply therewith. 
If this Court finds that such a duty exists, which it should, then the conclusions of 
the law of the trial court are erroneous. Stated differently, it matters not that Appellee was 
relying upon a different, outdated, version of the statute. She had a duty to know the 
current version of the statute and her reliance on an outdated version should not and 
cannot shield her from contempt. 
-12-
POINT III 
THIS COURT SHOULD EXPRESS A DUTY ON 
PARENTS IN DIVORCE CONTEXTS WHERE 
CHILDREN ARE SUBJECT TO VISITATION TO 
KNOW AND OBEY THE MOST RECENT AND 
CURRENT GOVERNING VISITATION 
STATUTE 
As set forth above, there are numerous contexts in which an individual is deemed 
to have a duty to know the law. See, e.g., Union Pacific Railroad Company v. Sterling H. 
Nelson & Sons, Inc., 552 P.2d 649, 651 (Utah 1976) ("The defendant had a duty to know 
what the laws were . . . ."); Board of Education of Nebo School Dist. V. Jeppson, 280 P. 
1065,1069 (Utah 1929) ("Generally speaking, all men are presumed to know the law, and, 
generally speaking, this presumption cannot be overcome by proof to the contrary/'); 
Ferguson v. Allen, 26 P. 570 (Utah 1891) ("Officers of election are, like other persons, 
presumed to know the law . . . ."). 
In the present case, it does not seem that it would be a stretch or even a departure 
from present law and governing statutes to require that a person be aware of and comply 
with the latest statute governing visitation. In Jeppson, the Utah Supreme Court stated that 
all men are presumed to know the law and cannot use ignorance or mistake as an ally in 
avoiding this duty. Appellee has done jus>t this and she has succeeded in so doing, at least 
at the triai court ievei. 
There is no dispute in this matter that Appellee denied visitation to Appellant. There 
is no question as to the time, date and duration of the denial. There is no dispute that 
there was no offer to make up any missed visitation until such time as Appellant scheduled 
the subject Order to Show Cause. Appellant testified that she relied on an old version of 
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the statute that was different than the version of the statute that governed visitation at that 
time. In other words, Appellee successfully claimed ignorance of the law as a defense. 
If ignorance of the law is not a defense under general circumstances (See Union 
Pacific, 552 P.2d at 651; Jeppson, 280 P. at 1069; Ferguson, 26 P. 570), it should not be 
allowed as a defense when there is a specifically defined situation (divorce and visitation) 
and a specific statute. In other words, all a party has to know is the visitation statute and 
not the iaw generally. 
As set forth above, Appellant is not advocating a large or onerous burden in this 
matter. Appellant is merely advocating that a parent, in divorce where minor children are 
involved and subject to visitation, keep himself or herself aware of and apprised of any 
changes to the statutes governing visitation. This Court can take judicial notice that Utah 
Code Ann. § 30-3-35 was enacted in 1993 and was amended in 1997, 2000, 2001 and 
2003. Thus, in a twelve year period, this statute has undergone four amendments. It 
would seem likely that the legislature will continue to modify this statute. This statute is 
reasonably short and fairly easy to understand. Consistent, therefore, with the above case 
law indicating a person's duty to know the law, Appellant requests that this Court express 
such a duty with respect to the visitation statute on divorced parents who have minor 
children subject to visitation. Appellant further submits that expressing such a duty will be 
in the best interests of children in divorce as it will require parents to remain current with 
visitation changes and to comply therewith. 
Appellant respectfully requests that this Court issue a ruling requiring that parents 
in this and similar contexts become familiar and remain familiar and comply with the 
visitation statute as it currently exists and as it changes over time. 
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CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, Appellant respectfully requests that this Court express a 
duty of divorced parents with minor children subject to visitation to know and comply with 
the most current and governing version of the visitation statute. Appellant further requests 
that this Court overturn the trial court's ruling that Appellee could not be held in contempt 
and award him his costs and attorney fees and remand for any appropriate and necessary 
proceedings. Orai argument requested. 
DATED this dl)~tia\/ of April, 2005. A l l 
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ADDENDUM I 
HOFF.l INC N \N AYMENT. i I V 
\\\ A1NV:". T. liOFl 1 INC, l>.n No. <>403 
\ltonioy for Petitioner 
51 East 400 North. WU\o \ 
Cedar City, Utah 84720 
Telephone (435) 586-3300 
Facsimile (435) 586-4288 
IN THE FIFTH JUOICIAI, DISTRICT COURT, IRON COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
RONALD W.HARDY 
A o n i : ; p 
JEAN HARDY (SMELTZER), 
Respondents. 
Civil No. 944500067 
Judge: J. Philip Eves 
1 0 i n 1 l l l O l l l U L L V ^ I V . C l l l i V ^ U V ^ I V J I V ^ LIJV^ V ^ U U I l U l 
"> M o w 0 / 1 T f \ A / 1 r ^ , > r - r i ^ T - » l * / N t K p O ^ , , ^ 1 ^ O k , - ^ . - * . , O U „ . . 
i i v i u Y ^ ^ , x_\JvJ-T, p u i D L i a i l l I U U i C V . U U 1 L O W l G C l LU O l l U V 
Cause (Denial of Visitation) dated May 12, 2003, based on Plaintiffs Motion for Order to Show 
Cause dated May 8, 2003. The Court, having reviewed Plaintiffs motion, heard argument and 
testimonv of the oarties and being otherwise beine fullv advised in the oremises. now, therefore. 
enter it s: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Defendant denied Petitioner effectively two (2) days of visitation over the Presidents' 
Holiday, 2002; 
2. Defendant relied upon an outdated version of the visitation statute that, by 
Presidents7 Holiday, 2002, had been modified to expand the visitation on said 
holiday; 
v. S I U I O 
I N H i ! U i \ W l s u » i^U 11 n i l ] ] i l k O l k l 1 U \ i I si Oil Ol UK 1 U 
^ S \bsL qik nt imendmuits 10 I IK stituk i \ p moid \ isit Mion on Pusuk nis I lolui i\ 
l t o i l o w 
^ M) <> W g U n \ V\ K J u p o i ^ ,
 (l l m L o l n D i \ 
he^ inning it 0 00 p m on 1 I id i\ until 7 00 p n\ on 
Mind .V uiilv.^ ilte holiday i \ t e , Jn h , , length.n 
/ M " n n l ( - I ^K (- n t >ll t 1 r 
CONC L I J S I O N S OF LAW 
1 I \ u i though Defendant denied Plaintiff visitation because Ditenil ml w is u lying 
noon an old veision of the statute and dirt m tart deliver the p i t i e s mmm ch, |rt 
for pait of the visitation, the Court cannot conclude that Defendant s denial was 
willful, 
2 Defendant cannot, theiefoie, be held in contempt, 
3 Plainnff is entitled to make up visitation which shall consist of one week ot 
uninterrupted visitation during the summer of 2004, 
4 The Court's Oidei to Show Cause is therefoie dismissed, 
5 P>om parties shall focai then costs and attorneys' lees 
ORDER 
Based on the loregoing, the Couit s Order to Show Cause dated May 12 2003 is heieby 
dismissed 
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ADDENDUM II 
l b l mu>i\( i ]0 ] 35 
U) the in\ olvement oi the noncustodial pai ent in the school community 
lehgious, 01 othei i elated activities oi the child 
(]) the availability of the noncustodial paient to caie foi the child when 
the custodial paient is unavailable to do so because of woik oi othei 
uieumstanees 
(k) a substantial and chionic pattern of missing, canceling oi denying 
leguiarly scheduled paient time 
(1) the minimal duiation of and lack of significant bonding in the 
parents relationship pnor to the conception of the child 
(m) the parent time schedule of siblings, 
(n) the lack of reasonable alternatives to trie needs of i nuismg diild 
and 
(o) any othei criteria the court determines relevant to the best interests 
of the child 
(3) The court shall enter the leasons underlying its orclei for parent time 
that 
(a) mcoipoiates a parent tune schedule piovided in Section 30 3 35 or 
30 3 35 5, or 
(b) provides more or less parent time than a parent time schedule 
provided in Section 30 3 35 or 30 3 35 5 
(4) Once the parent time schedule has been established, the parties may not 
altei the schedule except by mutual consent of the parties or a court order 
History C 1953, 30 3 34, enacted by L ment effective Apnl 30 2001 substituted pai 
1993, ch 131, ^ 4, 1997, ch 80,^ 2, 2001, ch ent time for visitation and made stylistic 
255, ^ 10 changes 
Amendment Notes — The 2001 amend 
30-3-35. Minimum schedule for parent- t ime for chi ldren 5 
to 18 years of age. 
(1) The parent time schedule m this section applies to children 5 to 18 years 
of age 
(2) If the parties do not agree to a parent time schedule, the following 
schedule shall be considered the minimum parent time to which the noncus 
todial parent and the child shall be entitled 
(a) d) one weekday evening to be specified by the noncustodial parent 
or the court from 5 30 p m until 8 30 p m , or 
(n) at the election of the noncustodial parent, one weekday fi om the 
time the child's school is regularly dismissed until 8 30 p m , unless 
the court directs the application of Subsection (2)(a)(i), 
(b) d) alternating weekends beginning on the first weekend after the 
entry of the decree from 6 p m on Friday until 7 p m on Sunday 
continuing each year or 
(n) at the election of the noncustodial parent, Irom the ume the 
child's school is regularly dismissed on Friday until 7 p m on Sunday, 
unless the court directs the application of Subsection (2)(b)(i), 
(c) holidays take precedence over the weekend parent time, and 
changes shall not be made to the regular rotation of the alternating 
weekend parent time schedule, 
(d) if a holiday falls on a regularly scheduled school day, the noncusto-
dial parent shall be responsible for the child's attendance at school for that 
school day, 
(e) d) if a holiday falls on a weekend or on a Friday or Monday and the 
total holiday period extends beyond that time so tha t the child is free 
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from school and the parent is free from work, the noncustodial parent 
shall be entitled to this lengthier holiday period, or 
(n) at the election of the noncustodial parent, parent-time over a 
scheduled holiday weekend may begin from the time the child's school 
is regularly dismissed at the beginning of the holiday weekend until 7 
p.m on the last day of the holiday weekend, 
(f) in years ending in an odd number, the noncustodial parent is 
entitled to the following holidays: 
d) child's birthday on the day before or after the actual birthdate 
beginning at 3 p.m until 9 p.m.; at the discretion of the noncustodial 
parent, he may take other siblings along for the birthday; 
(ii) Martin Luther King, J r beginning 6 p.m. on Friday until 
Monday at 7 p.m. unless the holiday extends ior a lengthier period of 
time to which the noncustodial parent is completely entitled; 
(iii) spring break or Easter holiday beginning at 6 p.m. on the day 
school lets out for the holiday until 7 p m on the Sunday before school 
resumes; 
(iv) Memorial Day beginning 6 p.m. on Friday until Monday at 7 
p.m., unless the holiday extends for a lengthier period of time to which 
the noncustodial parent is completely entitled, 
(v) July 24th beginning 6 p.m. on the day before the holiday until 
11 p.m. on the holiday; 
(vi) Veteran's Day holiday beginning 6 p.m. the day before the 
holiday until 7 p.m. on the holiday; and 
(vii) the first portion of the Christmas school vacation as defined in 
Subsection 30-3-32(3)(b) plus Christmas Eve and Christmas Day until 
1 p.m., so long as the entire holiday is equally divided; 
(g) in years ending in an even number, the noncustodial parent is 
entitled to the following holidays: 
(i) child's birthday on actual birthdate beginning at 3 p.m. until 9 
p.m.; at the discretion of the noncustodial parent, he may take other 
siblings along for the birthday, 
(ii) Washington and Lincoln Day beginning at 6 p.m. on Friday 
until 7 p.m. on Monday unless the holiday extends for a lengthier 
period of time to which the noncustodial parent is completely entitled; 
(iii) July 4th beginning at 6 p.m. the day before the holiday until 11 
p.m. on the holiday; 
(iv) Labor Day beginning at 6 p.m. on Friday until Monday at 7 
p.m. unless the holiday extends for a lengthier period of time to which 
the noncustodial parent is completely entitled, 
(v) the fall school break, if applicable, commonly known as U.E.A. 
weekend beginning at 6 p.m. on Wednesday until Sunday at 7 p.m. 
unless the holiday extends for a lengthier period of time to which the 
noncustodial parent is completely entitled; 
(vi) Columbus Day beginning at 6 p.m. the day before the holiday 
until 7 p.m on the holiday; 
(vii) Thanksgiving holiday beginning Wednesday at 7 p.m. until 
Sunday at 7 p.m; and > 
(viii) the second portion of the Christmas school vacation, including 
New Year's Day, as defined in Subsection 30-3-32(3)(b) plus Christmas 
day beginning at 1 p.m. until 9 p m , so long as the entire Christmas 
holiday is equally divided, 
(h) the custodial parent is entitled to the odd year holidays in even 
years and the even year holidays m odd years; 
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d) Father 's Day shall be spent with the natural or adoptn e father evei v 
year beginning at 9 a m until 7 p m on the holiday. 
(j) Mother's Day shall be spent with the natural or adopti\e mothei 
every year beginning at 9 a m until 7 p m on the holiday 
(k) extended parent-time with the noncustodial parent may be 
(1) up to four weeks consecutive at the option of the noncustodial parent, 
(n) two weeks shall be uninterrupted time for the noncustodial parent, 
and 
(m) the remaining two weeks shall be subject to parent-time for the 
custodial parent consistent with these guidelines, 
(1) the custodial parent shall have an identical two-week period of 
uninterrupted time during the childrens summer vacation hum bchool for 
purposes of vacation, 
(m) if the child is enrolled in year-round school, the noncustodial 
paient 's extended parent-time shall be Vz of the vacation time for year-
round school breaks, provided the custodial parent has holiday and phone 
visits, 
(n) notification of extended parent-time or vacation weeks with the 
child shall be provided at least 30 days in advance to the other parent, and 
(o) telephone contact shall be at reasonable hours and for reasonable 
duration 
(3) Any elections required to be made in accordance with this section by 
either parent concerning parent-time shall be made a part of the decree and 
made a part of the parent-time order 
History: C. 1953, 30-3-35, enacted by L. 30, 2001, substituted 'Mai t in Luthei King, Ji 
1993, ch. 131, ^ 5; 1997, ch. 80, ^ 3; 2000, ch. Day" for "Human Rights Day' in Subsection 
97, § 1; 2001, ch. 9, *> 50; 2001, ch. 255, ** 11; (2)(f )(n) and substituted "Washington and Lin 
2003, ch. 269, ^ 5. coin Day" for "President's Day" in Subsection 
Amendment Notes . — The 2000 amend (2)(g)(n) 
ment, effective March 10, 2000, added Subsec The 2001 amendment by ch 255, effective 
tions (2)(a)(n), (2)(b)(u), (2)(e)(n), and (3) and April 30, 2001, substituted "paient time" for 
made related changes, revised the piovisions "visitation" throughout the section 
regarding three day weekends for Human This section has been leconciled by the Office 
Rights Day and President's Day in Subsections of Legislative Research and General Counsel 
(2)(f)(n) and (2)(g)(n), and revised the provi The 2003 amendment, effective May 5, 2003, 
sions regarding spring break oi Easter holiday mseited "including New Year's Day" in Subsec 
in Subsection (2)(f)(m) tion (2)(g)(vm) added Subsection (2)(h), and 
The 2001 amendment by ch 9, effective Apul made changes in subsection designations 
30-3-35.5. Minimum schedule for parent- t ime for chi ldren 
unde r five years of age. 
(1) The parent-time schedule in this section applies to children under five 
years old 
(2) If the parties do not agree to a parent-time schedule, the following 
schedule shall be considered the minimum parent-time to which the noncus-
todial parent and the child shall be entitled 
(a) for children under five months of age 
d) six hours of parent-time per week to be specified by the court or 
the noncustodial parent preferably 
(A) divided into three parent-time periods, and 
(B) in the custodial home, established child care setting, or 
other environment familiar to the child, and 
